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ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to diversification plans for public high school 
enrollment in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
(2007). Unlike the diversity plan upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), where law school 
applicants were potentially denied a benefit, all students in the Seattle plan were awarded 
a high school seat but perhaps not in their preferred school. Nevertheless, this plan was 
struck down by the Court as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the grounds that 
it was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. The question of whether diversity can withstand 
the other aspect of strict scrutiny, serving a compelling government interest, was not as 
definitively answered, although the prospects appear dim. A reasonable inference from 
Parents Involved for public human resource management is that race-conscious diversity 
plans are not likely to receive constitutional cover from the current Court. 
  
Although academic and practical discussions about equal employment opportunity 
(EEO) have shifted recently from affirmative action to managing diversity, 
the constitutional framework for the latter is largely speculative. Indeed, the 
shifting sands of EEO constitutional law for public personnel management have 
most recently been shaped by cases stemming from public educational settings. 
Immediately recognized as a landmark case, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) relating to law school admissions boosted hopes that a 
range of efforts to further the diversification of public services and, by extension, 
public workplaces would be afforded constitutional cover. The Court revisited this 
diversity question by subjecting racial balancing plans in public high schools to 
the strict scrutiny test in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (2007). 
 
STRICK SCRUTINY 
All governmental programs that use race or national origin as a classification for the 
distribution of benefits trigger the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
and are held to a heightened standard of judicial review. Formalized for all levels of government 
in Adarand v. Pena (1995), the Supreme Court held that “all racial classifications, 
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny” (p. 227). This test requires that such a plan 
serve a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. 
In the context of racial classifications, the notion of a compelling governmental interest 
is inherently defined on a case-by-case basis, but generally requires that individuals be 
treated as persons and not merely members of a group, and that the governmental action 
be designed to remedy prior discrimination by the government and not merely the 
effects of general societal discrimination. Narrow tailoring requires that “there must be 
no alternatives for achieving the government interest that are less restrictive on the interests 
or rights of parties who may be impacted by the classifications” (Kellough, 2006, 
p. 99). 
 
Grutter v. Bollinger 
The first type of racial classification scheme that has passed strict scrutiny review is 
that designed to remedy past intentional discrimination by the government. Such diversity 
plans are typically court-ordered and expire either on a particular date or when the 
discriminatory condition has been alleviated. In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), the 
Supreme Court recognized admission to higher education as a second context in which 
race can be used as a criterion under the Fourteenth Amendment. Here the racial identity 
of law school applicants was legitimized as a means to achieve classroom diversity, 
largely because each applicant received a robust individualized review and race/ethnicity 
was but one nondefinitive component of social background consideration. Thus, the 
use of race in this scheme did not unduly harm nonminority applicants. Writing for a 5- 
4 majority, Justice O’Connor also relied heavily on the particular context of higher education, 
as the majority extended considerable deference to the evidence of the benefits 
of diversity forwarded by the defendants. Although the decision literally applied only to 
higher education admissions, the Court acknowledged that diversity can be a compelling 
governmental interest and that strategies for achieving it can be so narrowly tailored 
as to pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test. 
The practical extent to which the Grutter (2003) ruling provided constitutional cover 
for diversity efforts in public human resource management (HRM) was not explicitly 
addressed by the Court. Naylor and Rosenbloom (2004) explained, however, that “had 
the Court rejected diversity as a compelling governmental interest in the context of higher 
education, the justices probably would be less likely to consider it compelling in most 
aspects of public sector human resources management” (pp. 150-151). Citing Justice 
O’Connor’s connection between diversity and “the civic life of the nation” (Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 2003, pp. 19-20), Naylor and Rosenbloom (2004) contended that the decision 
appeared to be “broad enough to make diversity a constitutionally compelling 
public sector HRM interest” (p. 155). Sisneros (2004) advanced a similarly sanguine 
interpretation, based on a “university admissions/public employment nexus,” that public 
personnel managers ought to maintain and expand race-based diversification efforts 
(p. 178). Indeed, Sisneros concluded that members of the public human resource management 
profession ought to “sleep in under the warmth of Grutter’s constitutional 
cover” (p. 181). 
 
To the contrary, Carcieri (2004b) argued that constitutional cover for public personnel 
programs from Grutter (2003) is unlikely because O’Connor’s majority opinion 
was “expressly limited to public university admissions” and the core contextual 
differences between public education and employment (p. 74). Due to the relatively 
volatile nature of constitutional law with regard to equal employment opportunity 
(see Kellough, 2006), Carcieri (2004a) concluded that the Grutter decision could 
soon be overturned due to a change in the Court’s view of diversity and/or by the 
replacing of the next retiring member of the Grutter majority (pp. 185-186). Indeed, 
Justice O’Connor retired from the Court in 2006 and was replaced by Justice Samuel 
Alito, who brought a solid record of conservative jurisprudence from the federal 
bench. It was in this context that diversity plans for public high school education 
were subjected to strict scrutiny review by the Court in 2007. 
 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 
The question of whether and when diversity can be a compelling governmental interest 
with a narrowly tailored plan was revisited in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (2007).1 The city of Seattle is relatively diverse, 
with a majority minority population, although certain areas of the city are dominated by 
one or another racial/ethnic group. Despite having never operated a segregated school 
system or been subject to court-ordered desegregation, School District No. 1 tried voluntarily 
to prevent the de facto segregation that would likely occur if students were 
assigned to high schools strictly on a geographical basis. Thus, students submitted a 
ranked preference among the 10 high schools in the district, but this preference was 
weighed against the goal of relative racial balance in all of the high schools. The race 
of students was classified as either White or non-White, the latter of which was a 
catchall category for African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian American 
students. These racial classifications were often the sole determinant for which school 
a student was enrolled in, especially when the diversity within a particular high school 
deviated substantially from the city’s demographics. 
In order to satisfy strict scrutiny, the Seattle plan to create racially diverse high 
schools would have to both further a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly 
tailored to serve that purpose. In a split 5-4 ruling,2 the Court ruled that the 
plan was not sufficiently narrowly tailored, but the question of a compelling government 
interest was not clearly settled. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
Roberts emphasized the absence of a court order to remedy past intentional discrimination 
and the distinction between the broad diversity effort upheld in Grutter 
(2003) and the Seattle scheme.3 Relying exclusively on a binary conception of race, 
Seattle’s multigroup label of “non-White” was often the only factor used to determine 
school placement. The stated goal for Seattle high schools was racial parity, 
however awkwardly defined, as opposed to the individualized assessments and 
robust notion of diversity seen in Grutter. Thus, the Seattle plan was struck down for 
not being sufficiently narrowly tailored. 
 
The Court also questioned whether diversity, in and of itself, constitutes a compelling 
governmental interest. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that Grutter (2003) 
did not establish a broad precedent establishing diversity in all educational contexts, 
but was tied specifically to the particular importance of a diverse student body in a 
higher educational setting. Although the Seattle school district cited the goal of 
diversity, their plan was “directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective 
this Court has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate” (Parents Involved, 2007, 
p. 18). Chief Justice Roberts further opined that the use of race to remedy past racial 
discrimination means that race, as a decision-making factor, will never achieve the 
irrelevance intended under the Constitution (p. 22). Simply put, the Constitution 
is color-blind, and “remedying past societal discrimination does not justify raceconscious 
government action” (p. 23). 
 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy broke with the majority on precisely this point: the 
question of whether diversity can ever be a compelling governmental interest. 
Although joining the majority on the narrowly tailored question, Justice Kennedy 
(Parents Involved, concurring, 2007) wrote a consenting opinion arguing that it was 
possible for race-conscious strategies to be devised that would satisfy strict scrutiny 
review. Such strategic devises might include  
 
strategic site selection for new schools; drawing attendance zones with general 
recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special 
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, 
performance, and other statistics by race. (p. 8) 
 
It is quite notable that this list contains no practical suggestions for the crafting of 
race-conscious admission plans that could withstand strict scrutiny review. Thus, 
Justice Kennedy supported the notion that diversity plans can be devised to further 
the compelling governmental interest of diversity, but such plans must still be narrowly 
tailored, and his notion of narrowly tailored is quite narrow indeed. 
The four dissenters found the Seattle scheme to suffice as a narrowly tailored plan 
that served a compelling governmental interest. Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer 
argued that the deference that was paid to the institution in Grutter (2003) with regard 
to the value of diversity in a higher educational setting ought to apply equally to the high 
school context in Parents Involved (2007, dissenting, p. 41). Furthermore, the dissent 
emphasized that no student was denied access or a benefit under the Seattle plan; rather, 
some students were merely denied a preference for which school to attend. Although 
such a result is likely to be disappointing to the student, the denial of the first preference 
neither stigmatizes the student nor imparts judgment as to his or her intellectual 
or academic abilities (p. 35). In this way, the Seattle school board should have been 
given at least as much deference as was extended to the law school in Grutter, where 
students were literally extended or denied the benefit of attending a public law school. 
Under the Seattle plan, all students receive the benefit of attending a public school; it is 
simply a question of whether they are admitted to the school of their first preference. 
This line of reasoning would suggest that if a plan that denies a benefit or access survives 
strict scrutiny review, then a plan that merely denies a preference ought to as well, 
as the harm suffered is seemingly less severe. 
 
DISCUSSION 
If indeed the aforementioned line of cases contains a “university admissions/public 
employment nexus” (Sisneros, 2004), then Parents Involved (2007) is particularly noteworthy 
for public human resource professionals. Here, a race-conscious plan that 
denied preferences but still afforded access failed a strict scrutiny review. This is 
a notable deviation from the prevailing logic in the Grutter (2003) case, where a raceconscious 
plan that denied access outright was upheld. Importantly, both cases were 
decided on a 5-4 vote, with one member of the Grutter majority having been replaced 
with a more conservative justice in the Parents Involved decision. Reflecting on the 
impact and permanence of the Grutter decision on public personnel management, 
Kellough (2003) tellingly observed that such race-conscious programs will pass constitutional 
Muster 
 
provided there is no further action by the Supreme Court to tighten current Constitutional 
limitations imposed on preferential programs. Such a ruling by the Court could 
come, however, in the form of a very restrictive interpretation of the circumstances that 
would comprise a government interest sufficiently compelling to enable preferential 
affirmative action to survive strict scrutiny. (pp. 221-222) 
 
Given the rationale expressed in the Parents Involved opinion regarding a plan that 
merely denied a preference, one can reasonably assume that the current Court will be 
highly suspicious of any race-conscious plan that denied access or a benefit outright 
and, therefore, wonder if Grutter would now be decided differently. 
Those two cases clearly underscore the current volatility of the state of EEO law 
and have critical practical implications for public HRM. Despite Justice Kennedy’s 
apparent support for the end of diversity, his concurring opinion left a very small 
opening for which a narrowly tailored means could withstand strict scrutiny. Justice 
Kennedy neglected to thoroughly explain how a race-conscious program could be 
sufficiently narrowly tailored in practice. Such a pessimistic appraisal of his position 
is supported by the fact that Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter (2003), suggesting 
that the application of even that robust a conception of diversity in a public HRM 
setting would not meet his approval. 
 
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy parted with the majority in Parents Involved (2007) 
on the central question of whether diversity can ever be a legitimate compelling governmental 
interest. One is reminded of the post-Grutter (2003) analysis of Naylor and 
Rosenbloom (2004), who observed that a rejection of diversity as a compelling governmental 
interest in the context of higher education would likely spell defeat for such 
arguments in support of race-conscious programs in public sector HRM. The recognition 
of diversity as a compelling government interest, however, offers little comfort if 
the bar for achieving a sufficiently narrowly tailored plan is, practically speaking, set 
impossibly high. In light of the Parents Involved decision, the near-term prospects for 
the goal of diversity under strict scrutiny review seem to be very slim indeed in public 
education or public human resource management. 
 
NOTES 
1. A second case, Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education (2007), was considered and 
decided conjointly due to a similar fact pattern and constitutional issues. This legal brief focuses 
exclusively 
on the Seattle case for clarity of the discussion and analysis. 
2. The five Justices who supported the majority opinion were Roberts, Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Kennedy, whereas the four dissenters were Ginsberg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter. 
3. The change in context from higher education to high school meant that although Grutter v. 
Bollinger (2003) was not controlling precedent, it served as a useful juxtaposition for the authors of the 
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 
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